Why international oil companies choose to enter into joint operating agreement by Peters, Mary & Kumar, Manu
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA
53, No 2, pp. 175–180 (2012) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur.53.2012.2.5
1216-2574 / USD 20.00
© 2012 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
KALEIDOSCOPE
MARY SABINA PETERS*–MANU KUMAR**
Why International Oil Companies Choose to Enter 
into Joint Operating Agreement
Introduction
This essay brings forth the nature of Joint Operating Agreement’s (JOA) and its key 
features. The key features of JOA answer the question so as to why do powerful players as 
international oil companies choose to enter into such agreements. JOA’s are used in capital 
intensive resource industries by those companies who want to restrict their exposure, 
particularly in limiting cost or liability. Investmental forethought necessitates a mix of 
participants who contributes towards fi nancing, intelligence, access to market and access to 
project itself.
The usual form of association establishing the framework within which exploration 
for, and exploitation of, resources takes place is the JOA which is often considered to be a 
form of joint venture. The JOA can be considered the joint venture par excellence as its 
structure is found in most contractual joint ventures.1
Joint ownership of an oil and gas interest can be created through several factual 
scenarios.2 The most common is when owners of respective oil and gas leases pool their 
interests3 to meet a standard spacing unit that is legislatively prescribed.4 Furthermore, 
another common reason for joint ownership is the economic risk of an unprofi table well.5 
Mineral depletion has required investors to drill deeper than ever before to obtain 
production.6 This type of drilling operation is an expensive undertaking.7 As a result of 
these costs even the largest companies will seek a joint investor to share the risk and cost of 
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1 Bean, G. M. D.: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures. Oxford, 1995. 3–4.
2 Kuntz, E. O. et al.: Oil and Gas Law: Cases and Materials. St. Paul (MN.), 3rd ed., 1999. 622. 
(providing a basic overview of joint ownership and the issues created as a result of multiple 
ownership).
3 Lowe, J. S.: Oil and Gas Law. Eagan (MN), 3rd ed., 1995. 437–438.
4 Ibid.
5 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law… op. cit. 622.
6 Hazlett, G. W.: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements. Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute, 3 (1957), 277.
7 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law… op. cit. 
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drilling.8 These risks are often leveraged by sharing them through joint development 
agreements, the most common being the JOA.9 When investors or operators are considering 
entering into a JOA there are numerous issues to be considered.10 A well designed JOA will 
clearly defi ne each of these issues and will cater to the individual needs of the parties.11 
Examples of issues that need to be addressed include: who will act as the operator, what 
acreage will be covered by the agreement, the distribution of production profi ts, and how 
the costs of exploration will be divided among the parties.12 Failure to properly address any 
of these important issues could mire the parties of the JOA in expensive and lengthy 
litigation.13 One oil and gas author has cautioned drafters by stating that the cost of correctly 
drafting “a thousand different agreements may be nominal in comparison to the cost to their 
client of a major defi ciency” leading to litigation.14
JOAs are commonly created on a standardized form that the parties modify.15 The 
American Association of Petroleum Landmen (A.A.P.L.) fi rst developed a model form 
operating agreement in 1956.16 This standardized form was created in an attempt to give 
basic guidance to the attorneys that are involved in negotiation of the development 
agreements between operators and non-operators.17 Generally, the operator will be 
responsible for the day-to-day production duties and the non-operator will only share in the 
costs and profi ts from the production.18 The operator traditionally is a sophisticated party 
with extensive experience in the oil and gas industry. Therefore, the JOA will generally 
grant the operator broad rights in production decisions.19 Typically, operators have a large 
fi nancial investment in the development and production process.20 Thus, they will 
commonly make decisions that will benefi t both parties.21 It is when the interests of the 
operator and the non-operator diverge that the issue of duty arises between the parties.
1. Scope of the JOA
JOA typically involves two or more legal persons combining property and expertise to carry 
out a single business enterprise in which they have a joint proprietary interest a joint right 
to control and share profi ts and losses.22 Conceptually, a JOA comprises the “constitution” 
  8 Hazlett: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements. op. cit. at 277.
  9 Ibid.
10 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law… op. cit. at 622.
11 Hazlett: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements. op. cit. at 279–280.
12 Eyring, H. J.: Comment, The Oil and Gas Unit Operator’s Duty to Nonoperating Working 
Interest Owners. Brigham Young University Law Review, (1987), 1293, 1294–1297. 
13 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Wilson, 976 P. 2d 941, 941 (Kan. 1999). When one considers the attorney 
fees and legitimate costs that were expended by all of the parties to this litigation, it readily shows the 
importance of properly drafting a joint operating agreement.
14 Hazlett: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements. op. cit. at 279–281.
15 Ibid. at 278.
16 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law… op. cit. at 623.
17 Hazlett: Drafting of Joint Operating Agreements. op. cit. at 278–280.
18 Eyring: Comment, The Oil and Gas Unit Operator’s Duty… op. cit. 1293. 
19 Kuntz: Oil and Gas Law… op. cit. 
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Maliss v. Bankers Trust Co., 717 F 2d 683 (1983).
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which governs the joint venture, akin to partnership or to the “Memorandum and Article of 
Association” of a company.23 JOA’s is typically specifi c that among the parties the 
relationship is one of tenants in common and not one of partnership.24 JOA is a specifi ed 
project hence it is clearly defi ned and limited in scope.25 A JOA is often preceded by a joint 
binding agreement or an area of mutual interest agreement (AMI) such agreement seeks to 
facilitate co-operation between oil companies and prevents them from undertaking activities 
with others. The area of mutual interest is often incorporated as a term of JOA.26 Moreover, 
the limited scope of a JOA is vital in setting limits to the co-ventures’ potential fi duciary 
duties.27
2. The parties to a JOA
JOA can only fully exist when there is a degree of surrendering of control. For that reason 
the choice of co-ventures’ is very vital. The free choice of a partner is important because it 
involves the trust and confi dence of other parties; this is called delectus personae.28 This 
free choice of associates in JOA is very signifi cant as it involves a longterm relationship 
and enormous amount of fi nancial contributions by each member. Pertinently, JOA’s places 
restrictions on the sale of interests in the venture to outsiders. This type of delectus personae 
forms the basis of mutual trust which in turn gives rise to the collaborative fi duciary 
relationship and corresponding fi duciary responsibilities on the co-venture.29 Furthermore, 
this kind of participation in management of the venture brings to light the abilities and 
performance of each co-venturer. Moreover, under JOA it is the percentage of interests 
which determines each party’s entitlements to ownership and benefi ts, liability to cost, 
expenses and risks.30
3. Property Interest
Common ownership of assets is a feature of joint venture, it amplifi es the sharing of risk, 
makes the relationship more intimate. In an incorporated joint venture, corporation is owned 
by the co-ventures’ and they own the assets indirectly whereas in a contractual joint venture 
the assets are owned as tenants in common.31 A co-venturer has different proportional 
interest in the assets and they arrange separate funding of its interest in the JOA, and also 
23 Taylor, M. P. G.–Winsor, P. P.: The Joint Operating Agreement: Oil and Gas Law. London, 
1989.
24 Model Clause 42 (5) Petroleum (Production) (seaward Areas) Regulations 1976 (S.I 
1976/1129).
25 Harding Boulton, A.: Finance in the “single venture” Consortium. Journal of Business Law, 
1961, 368.
26 Great Northern Petroleum and Mines Ltd. v. Merland Explorations Ltd. (1983) 43 AR 128, 
130 (Alta. Sc).
27 Bean: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures. op. cit. at 12.
28 Shaw, S.: Joint Operating Agreements. In: David, M. R. (ed.): Upstream Oil and Gas 
Agreements. 1996. chapter 2, 16.
29 Bean: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures. op. cit. 11.
30 Maliss v. Bankers Trust Co. op. cit.
31 BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt) (No. 2) (1982) 1WLR 925.
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give security to its lender over its interest in the assets.32 Pursuant to JOA, co-venturers’ 
have interest in the mutual undertakings which form choose in action.33 Under jurisdictions 
where co-venturers’ agree not to partition their interest strengthens the ties between the co-
venturers’ and the delectus personae.34 A joint venture entails common ownership where in 
the parties contribute to the venture both in terms of services and fi nances which are used 
for production purposes, which creates mutual reliance and keeps the contribution 
forthcoming.35
4. The Operator
The Operator is in regard to other joint ventures than joint operating agreements often 
known as the manager. In a JOA, the parties will appoint an Operator to act on the behalf of 
the joint venture. Effi ciency demands that one person conducts the operations rather than 
each exercise its separate rights.36 The Operator plays a key role in taking the work forward 
by proposing budgets and plans and running meetings. Also it acts as the agent of the parties 
in relation to third parties, including government liaison with the consent of the other 
parties.37 As a party to the JOA, the Operator has the liabilities as the other parties; i.e. its 
percentage interest share of joint obligations.38
5. The Operating Committee
The committee exercises over all control of, the joint operations in four stages: exploration, 
appraisal, development and production.39 It is composed of co-venturers or their 
representatives.40 Decisions are usually made on the bases of majority votes, the percentage 
is specifi ed in the JOA.41 A co-venturers voting right is in proportion to its interest. The 
Authorization for Expenditure (AFE) is granted by the committee. The collaborative 
fi duciary relationship levy’s fi duciary constrains on co-venturers in voting, thus where such 
constrains apply co-venturers are to act honestly and in best interest of the venture. The 
courts determine this requirement by taking into consideration the motivations of the co-
venturers’.42
32 Willoughby, G. D. M.: Financing the Development of the North Sea Oil Fields. Law Society 
Gazette, 72 (1975), 10.
33 Bean: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures. op. cit. at 13.
34 Forbes, J. R. S.–Lang, A. G.: Australian Mining and Petroleum Laws. 2nd ed., Sydney, 1987. 
para. 1907.
35 Page One Records Ltd. v. Britton (1968) 1 WLR 157.
36 Jefferys v. Smith (1820) 1 Jac. and W 298, 302-3:37 ER 389, 390–391.
37 Maliss v. Bankers Trust Co. op. cit.
38 Ibid. 17.
39 Taylor, M. P. G.–Tyne, S. M.: Taylor and Winsor on Joint Operating Agreements. 2nd ed., 
London, 1992. 
40 Ibid.
41 Bean: Fiduciary Obligations and Joint Ventures. op. cit.
42 Ibid. at 17.
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6. Fiduciary Duties
When the operator in trust for the parties makes profi t for the parties or performs a job, the 
operator shall be subject to fi duciary obligation.43 It is pertinent to note that a fi duciary 
relationship affects the relationship of that other person in a legal or practical sense.44 
Consequently under the JOA the operator has the following obligations:45 to disclose any 
personal interest that he may have in the property, account for the money invested, to 
exercise the account procedure in accordance with the principles of JOA, to protect and 
maintain the property without misuse and fi nally not to misuse the information imparted.
7. Default Clause
In a JOA a project is funded by the operator making calls upon the co-venturers to advance 
their respective shares of the expenditure in accordance with the terms of their agreements.46 
Where a party fails to meet a call and causes a default, JOA provides that non-defaulting 
parties take up the short fall pro rata.47 Various sanctions can be applied on the defaulter 
including loss of voting rights or of product rights and ultimate abetment or more drastically, 
forfeiture of its interest.48
8. Sole Risk and Non-Consent provisions
Joint ventures are seldom an association of equals.49 Therefore leaves enough room for 
diverging opinions. In order to avoid such confl icts “Sole Risk” and “Non-Consent” clauses 
are included in the JOA. A participant who has voted for a program but has been overruled 
by the majority and still wishes to proceed with the program represents the classic “Sole 
Risk” situation. The second situation where a dissenting participant does not wish to 
participate in the majority approved program–is generally referred to as “Non-Consent”. 
The function of these clauses is to allow those co–venturers’ who wish to proceed with 
certain work to do so without dissenters. Effectively, a sole risk project redefi nes the scope 
of the venture. The wells developed under this clause fall into the ambit of a sub-venture, 
the venture consist of those who join in it. So, also a non-consent operation can be treated 
as a sub-venture of a larger kind. The sole risk parties share the risk, costs and rewards of 
the operation between themselves in proportion to their interest in the sole risk venture. On 
occasions when such a venture is successful others can join upon paying a substantial 
premium, whereas under a non-consent venture late participation is possible with or without 
the payment of premium, depending on the provisions of the JOA.
43 Reading v. R, 2KB 232 (1949).
44 Hospital Products Ltd v. United states Surgical Corporation and others, 55 ACR 417, 454. 
(High Ct. Australia 1984.)
45 Boulting v. Actat, 2QB 606 I All.E.R 716 (1963).
46 Smith, E. E.: International Petroleum Development Agreements. Journal of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Law, 8. (1993), 62.
47 Ibid. 
48 Mosaic Oil NL v. Angari Pty Ltd. (No. 2) (1990) 20 NSWLR 280 (NSW SC).
49 See Black, A. J.–Dundas, H. R.: Joint Operating Agreements: An International Comparison 
from Petroleum Law. Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law, 8 (1992).
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Conclusion
Joint venture embodies an agreement between the parties for an enterprise created for a 
single project, involving a sharing of project risk. Together with the participation in the 
management and control of the venture, the co-venturers’ contribution creates a common 
interest in the success of the project. The JOA is widely used as a legal structure for natural 
resource exploration and development.50 There is co-ownership of property of the venture 
and input in its management. The fact that the venture is limited to a defi ned geographic 
area as it sets the boundaries of relationship between the co-venturers’. The JOA’s main 
difference from the joint venture is the possibility of sub-ventures being formed through the 
sole risk and non-consent operations. JOA’s are the contractual nexus balancing exploration 
and production expectation interests against confl ict with a particular regulatory regime. 
JOA is a fl exible document that can be moulded to meet expectations and desires of parties. 
It encourages exploration and development, while neither forcing a party to participate 
inexpensive risk venture non-prohibiting a party from prospering and conducting ventures 
when the requisite operating committee pass mark vote is not attained. JOA offers the oil 
and gas industry a fl exible, well written document to govern international oil and gas 
operations. 
50 Reagan, P. W. O.–Taylor, T. W.: Joint Ventures and Operating Agreements. Victoria University 
of Wellington Law Review, 14 (1984), 85, 87.
